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NOTES
and in the action for indemnity he would be entitled to complete
relitigation of all issues."
The court seemed impressed by the fact that no prior judg-
ment had been rendered against the claimant and indicated that
therefore his payment to the widow had been made without com-
pulsion. Whether the compromise settlement was made under le-
gal compulsion or voluntarily is a matter to be decided in the ac-
tion for indemnity. In most jurisdictions it is encumbent upon
the plaintiff to prove that his compromise was fair and reasonable
and that he was legally liable to the injured person,18 but in at
least one state the compromise itself is prima facie evidence of
the fairness of the settlement- and of the liability of the plaintiff
to the payee.19, In either case the question of compulsion is an is-
sue to be litigated and determined on the merits, and the absence
of prior judgment against the plaintiff should not be a bar to
the action.
It is submitted that the decision in Winfqrd v. Bullock finds
no support in the jurisprudence of Louisiana and is a departure
from the general rule of other states and of the federal system.
A. M. Posmu
PRESCRIPTION-CONTINUING ToRT-BURDEN OF APPORTIONMENT-
Plaintiff sued for damages to his land caused by salt water, waste
oil and other refuse which flowed intermittently from the defend-
ant's oil wells for four years. Defendant's plea of one year pre-
scription under Article 3536 was sustained, the court being con-
vinced that a greater portion of the damages occurred long prior
to the period fixed for prescription. The opinion is interesting
because of a dictum statement, the burden of proof rests on
plaintiff to show what part of the damage was sustained after
the period fixed for prescription. Parro v. Fifteen Oil Company,
26 So. (2d) 30 (La. App. 1946).
17. City of Wabasha v. Southworth, 54 Minn. 79, 55 N.W. 818 (1893);
Popkin Bros., Inc. v. Volk's Tire Co., 20 N.J. Misc. 1, 23 A.(2d) 162 (1941);
Globe Indemnity Co. v. Schmitt, 142 Ohio St. 595, 53 N.E.(2d) 790 (19-44);
Aberdeen Constr. Co. v. City of Aberdeen. 83 Wash. 429, 147 Pac. 2 (1915).
18. Smith v.. Foran, 43 Conn. 244. 21 Am. Rep. 647 (1875); Inhabitants of
Swansey v. Chace, 82 Mass. 303 (1860): Frank Martz Coach Co., Inc., v.
Hudson Bus Transportation Co., Inc., 133 N.J.L. 342, 44 A.(2d) 488 (1945);
Globe Indemnity Co. v. Schmitt, 142 Ohio St. 595, 53 N.E.(2d) 790 (1944);
Aberdeen Constr. Co. v. City of Aberdeen, 83 Wash. 429, 147 Pac. 2 (1915).
14 See Miles v. Southeastern Motor Truck Lines, Inc., 295 Ky. 156, 173
S.W.(2d) 990 (1943).
1. Art. 3538, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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Torts prescribe in one year.' Prescription, however, has trou-
bled the courts when the tortious acts are of a continuing nature.
2
The problem is susceptible to several different approaches. A few
courts adopt the theory that the damage sustained is one single
injury and refuse to let it be subdivided into its yearly quo-
tients. Approval might lead to either of two opposed conclu-
sions: First, one may say prescription is suspended until the
continuous tort is abated, the result being the plaintiff recovers
for all the damages he has sustained. Infrequently, this position
seems to have been taken by the Louisiana courts. 3 Should the
plaintiff be suing for an injunction, this would seem logical, pro-
vided the plaintiff had not been guilty of laches. However, should
the suit be for damages, it is difficult to justify such a holding, as
the Civil Code specifically enumerates the causes which suspend
the course of prescription.4 Second, the courts may hold the ac-
tion is prescribed one year from the time the wrongful conduct
began. The effect of this is that the plaintiff recovers nothing un-
less he brings his suit within one year. Though Louisiana seems
never to have chosen this position, there is language in a few deci-
sions in other jurisdictions which would support such an atti-
tude.5 The reasons advanced for such decisions do not seem
sound.6
Louisiana courts, as well as most other state courts, will gen-
erally permit the damage resulting from a continuing tort to be
apportioned. In these cases the problem of who has to prove
when the damage occurred is of utmost importance. In most
Louisiana cases the plaintiff has the burden. The justification
often advanced is that when one of the parties to a suit has more
means of knowledge concerning a matter to be proved than the
other, the onus is on him.7 This position, however, has not been
consistently adhered to, and it appears to be inconsistent with
the usual attitude toward prescription.8 Generally he who pleads
prescription must prove all the facts necessary to sustain his plea.
2. A series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an
unintermittent force, no matter how long a time it may occupy.
3. Werges v. St. Louis, Chicago & New Orleans iR. R., 35 La. Ann. 641
(1883); Johnson v. Gifford-Hill and Co., 174 La. 806, 141 So. 842 (1932).
4. Arts. 3521-3527, La. Civil Code of 1870.
5. Uvalde Electric Light Co. v. Parsons, 138 S.W. 163 (Tex. Civ. App.
1911).
6. The Texas court took the view that tort was a permanent one rather
than a continuing one.
7. Spyker v. International Paper Co., 173 La. 580, 138 So. 109 (1931);
Young v. International Paper Co., 179 La. 803, 155 So. 231 (1934).




If the act committed were a single tort, it is clear the defendant
would have to support his plea of prescription by proving the
act was committed over one year before the suit was brought.
Similarly, if the plaintiff were suing for damages inflicted by a
serious of separate torts, some, but not all, of which were com-
mitted more than a year prior to the date of institution of suit, it
would be incumbent on defendants to show which of these torts
were prescribed. Therefore, it follows that in cases involving
continuing wrongful conduct, the defendant should prove what
part of the damage was sustained prior to the period fixed for
prescription. It has been suggested that the practice of requiring
plaintiff, rather than defendant, to apportion the damage in order
to avoid the plea of prescription is attributable to an erroneous
interpretation of the misleading language of the 1902 amendment
to Article 3537.9
J. LuTmH JORDAN, JR.
SALEs-LTIGious REE1PNI-Duncan R. Crain filed suit
for partition by licitation, alleging himself to be owner of 32/33
interest in a tract of land. Defendants, plaintiff's children, ad-
mitted his right to a partition, but claimed that he was owner of
only 135/264 interest and prayed that partition be in kind. After
issue had been joined, three other parties, hereinafter referred
to as plaintiffs, were substituted as parties plaintiff. They had
acquired all of Duncan Crain's interest in the land by deed after
the suit had commenced, pursuant to an option purchased and
recorded prior to filing of Duncan Crain's petition.
At the trial, defendants tendered to the plaintiff the amount
the latter had paid for Crain's interest, and asked that they be
declared owners of plaintiffs' interest under Article 2652.2 The
trial court held that defendants had the right to acquire all of the
plaintiffs' interest by tendering the amount paid by. them to
Crain.
9. Art. 3537, La. Civil Code of 1870, as amended by La. Act 33 of 1902,
discussed by Malone, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1945-1946 Term, Torts and Workmen's Compensation, supra p. 246.
1. For a survey of the subject of litigious rights see Comments, The
Transfer of Litigious Rights in Louisiana Civil Law (1939) 1 LouISIANA LAW
REVIE W 593 and 818, and The Sale of a Litigious Right (1939) 13 Tulane L.
Rev. 448.
2. Art. 2652, La. Civil Code of 1870. He against whom a litigious right
has been transferred, may get himself released by paying to the transferee
the real price of the transfer, together with interest from its date.
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